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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 02-2846
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ANTONIO FLETCHER,
      a/k/a Tone,
                                                                               Antonio Fletcher,
     Appellant.
___________
On Appeal from the Order of the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(No. 00 Cr. 739)
District Court Judge: The Honorable Stephen M. Orlofsky
___________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
April 8, 2003
Before: ALITO, FUENTES, GREENBERG Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: June 20, 2003 )
2__________________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
__________________________
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
The matter before the Court is an appeal from the District Court’s entry of
judgment and imposition of a 120-month term of incarceration in connection with the
guilty plea of appellant Antonio Fletcher (“Fletcher”).  Fletcher agreed to waive his right
to prosecution by indictment and pleaded guilty to a single-count information charging
him with bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and 2.  The plea agreement
contained a standard provision in which Fletcher and the Government agreed that there
was no basis for either a downward or upward departure and that neither party would file
such a motion prior to sentencing.  Despite a thorough colloquy at his plea hearing,
Fletcher now claims that he did not understand this provision and that the District Court
erred in accepting his plea, notwithstanding his failure to object to the provision at that
hearing.  He seeks remand in order to permit him to file a motion for a downward
departure, or in the alternative, renegotiation of his plea agreement.  Fletcher has failed to
establish that it was plain error for the District Court to accept his guilty plea, and
therefore, we will affirm.
I.
On May 9, 2000, Fletcher and a co-conspirator, Richard Everett (“Everett”) robbed
the Equity National Bank in Lawnside, New Jersey.  They fled with a bag containing
3approximately $17,156.21.  Fletcher and Everett then led the police on a high speed chase
during which they caused another driver’s car to flip.  Later, they continued on foot into a
residential neighborhood, where they broke into a home and held an elderly couple at
gunpoint.
Despite the serious offenses committed, the Government offered Fletcher a
favorable plea agreement, permitting him to plead guilty to a single count of bank
robbery.  The plea agreement contained a standard provision stating that the “parties
agree that there is no basis for any upward or downward departure or any upward or
downward adjustment not set forth herein.  Accordingly, neither party will seek or argue
for any departure or adjustment not set forth herein.”  The provision appeared as part of a
list of stipulations in “Schedule A,” attached to the signed plea agreement.  At his plea
hearing, Fletcher stated on the record that he understood the entire plea agreement and
that he was entering into it voluntarily and knowingly.  He never objected to the provision
that precluded him from filing a motion for a downward departure.  Ultimately, the
District Court sentenced Fletcher to 120 months of imprisonment.
II.
Fletcher’s primary contention on appeal is that he did not understand and/or was
not informed of the provision in the plea agreement precluding the filing of a motion to
increase or decrease his sentence.  Therefore, Fletcher contends that the District Court
erred in accepting his guilty plea.  Specifically, he claims that he did not understand the
4downward departure provision because (1) the stipulations in Schedule A appear after his
signature on the last page of the body of the agreement; (2) at the plea hearing, Fletcher’s
copy of the plea agreement was missing the final page which contained the specific
provision in question; and (3) the District Court read a confusing statement which led
Fletcher to believe that he had preserved his right to pursue a motion for a downward
departure.
Because he failed to raise a timely objection to the purported error in the District
Court, we review the matter for plain error.  Under the plain error standard, Fletcher must
show that “(1) the District Court erred; (2) its error was plain, i.e., the error was ‘clear’ or
‘obvious’; (3) the error affected ‘[defendant’s] substantial rights’; and (4) the error
‘seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” 
United States v. Reynoso, 254 F.3d 467, 474 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v.
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)).
None of Fletcher’s contentions on appeal establish plain error.  First, the fact that
the stipulations in Schedule A are attached to the plea agreement after the signature page
is unremarkable.  Page two of the plea agreement specifically incorporates Schedule A by
reference, and Fletcher cannot claim that he did not know of the existence of the
stipulations because he only signed page four.  Second, at his plea hearing, Fletcher’s
counsel notified the Court that the copy of the plea agreement which he was reading at
that time was missing page six, where the downward departure stipulation appears. 
5Nevertheless, the Government promptly provided a copy of the missing page.  It also
bears repeating that the District Court specifically asked Fletcher if he understood all of
the stipulations and the plea agreement in its entirety.  Fletcher responded affirmatively to
both inquiries.
Third, Fletcher claims that the District Court misled him into believing that he
would be able to move for a downward departure, notwithstanding the plea agreement. 
The Court simply stated:
And do you understand that after your guideline range has been determined, that
the court has the authority under certain circumstances to depart from the guideline
range -- excuse me; depart from the guidelines and impose a sentence that is rather
more severe or less severe tha[n] is called for in the sentencing guidelines?
From this standard clarification which District Judges are required to make on the record,
Fletcher claims that he understood that he retained a right to file a downward departure
motion.  Specifically, Fletcher argues that “the defendant was advised explicitly by the
court that the court could depart downwardly from the guidelines, leading him to believe
that he would be able to make a motion asking the court for such a downward departure.” 
Appellant’s Brief, at 14.  We strain to see how a clarification about the District Court’s
independent authority to depart from the guidelines can be interpreted as preserving
Fletcher’s right to file a motion for downward departure, which he relinquished in an
unambiguous and favorable plea agreement.  In any event, the Court’s clarification cannot
be the basis of plain error in the manner advanced by Fletcher.
In closing, we also note that Fletcher’s requested relief--remand to permit him to
6file a motion for a downward departure, or alternatively, to permit him to renegotiate his
plea agreement--is a unilateral attempt to modify his plea agreement.  We find no grounds
to grant such extraordinary relief.  See United States v. Cianci, 154 F.3d 106, 110 (3d Cir.
1998) (“Under the law of this circuit, [defendant] cannot renege on his agreement.”). 
Fletcher has not moved to vacate his plea, and it is doubtful that he could do so in good
faith when his guilty plea was voluntary and intelligent.  Therefore, Fletcher’s attempt to
preserve the benefits of a favorable deal and, simultaneously, to recover relinquished
rights is denied.
III.
For the reasons set forth above, the District Court did not plainly err in accepting
Fletcher’s guilty plea.  We will affirm the judgment and sentence imposed by the District
Court.
7______________________________
TO THE CLERK OF COURT:
                                         Kindly file the foregoing opinion.
By the Court,
/s/ Julio M. Fuentes                           
Circuit Judge
